Criminal Protection of the Fetus in the Absence of Direct Intent (A Comparative Study)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66359/itqan.v1i5.046Keywords:
Fetal Protection, Unintentional Abortion, Praeterintentional Intent, Article 419, Dolus EventualisAbstract
This study evaluates the efficiency and adequacy of the criminal protection afforded to the fetus in cases where the direct criminal intent for abortion is absent, through a comparative analytical study between Iraqi and Egyptian laws on one hand, and the rulings of Islamic jurisprudence on the other. The research problem stems from the deficiency within contemporary positive laws that are mostly designed to confront intentional crimes, which raises issues in qualifying criminal liability when abortion occurs as a result of unintentional error (negligence) or exceeded intent (praeterintentional crime). The research concludes that Islamic jurisprudence is distinguished by establishing a comprehensive and early liability for unintentional abortion based on a flexible natural criterion, which is the state of the fetus’s separation (alive or dead). On the legislative level, the Iraqi legislator succeeds in bridging legislative gaps through Article (419) of the Penal Code, which criminalizes intentional assault leading to abortion without the intent to cause it. Conversely, Egyptian law suffers from a legislative vacuum in this regard, forcing the judiciary to adapt the rules of eventual intent (dolus eventualis). The study recommends that the Egyptian legislator draft an explicit text criminalizing assault leading to abortion, while calling on both legislators to refine terminology and expand the scope of protection to include cases where pregnancy should have been known, preventing offenders from escaping justice